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Celebrating Thurgood Marshall:
The Prophetic Dissenter
SUSAN LOW BLOCH*
Thurgood Marshall was born 100 years ago into a country sub-
stantially divided along color lines.  Marshall could not attend the
University of Maryland School of Law because he was a Negro;1 he
had trouble locating bathrooms that were not for “whites only.”2  To-
day, by contrast, we celebrate his life and accomplishments.  Broad-
way has a play called Thurgood devoted to him;3 Baltimore/
Washington International Airport is now BWI Thurgood Marshall
Airport;4 even the University of Maryland renamed its law library in
his honor.5  How did we come this far?  How far do we still have to
go?  This article will consider what Justice Marshall would think of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence during the seventeen years since his
retirement.  In my opinion, he would be “appalled, but not surprised,”
particularly by those decisions involving affirmative action, an area
about which he was especially passionate.  Justice Marshall would be
“appalled, but not surprised” because he foresaw the future direction
of the Court and did not like it.  In his last dissent, issued only hours
* Professor of Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law Center.  The author
wishes to thank her research assistants, David Armstrong, Nicola Bunick, and Boris Templeton
for their very useful help, as well as Georgetown University Law Center for its generous writer’s
grant and sabbatical.
1. JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 52-53 (1998).
2. Id. at 23 (noting the prevalence of Jim Crow laws at the time of Marshall’s birth, and, in
particular, a Maryland law requiring segregated public bathrooms).
3. See Charles Isherwood, Trials and Triumphs on the Road to Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2008, at E1; see also Zachary Pincus-Roth, Next on His Docket: A Supreme Challenge, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, at AR7.
4. See Jamie Stiehm, Civil Rights Pioneer’s Legacy Takes Flight at BWI Airport Marshall
Name Change is Effective Starting Tomorrow, BALT. SUN, Sept. 30, 2005, at 1A; see also Balti-
more/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport: Thurgood Marshall, http://www.
bwiairport.com/about_bwi/thurgood_marshall/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2009).
5. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 371; see also Susan Kinzie, Tracking Marshall’s Steps to
the Supreme Court; Exhibit Reveals Justice’s Diplomacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2008, at B3; see
discussion infra at n.63.
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before his surprising announcement that he would retire immediately,
Justice Marshall blasted the Court as it overruled two recent
precedents:
Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court’s decision mak-
ing.  Four Terms ago, a five-Justice majority of this Court held that
“victim impact” evidence of the type at issue in this case could not
constitutionally be introduced during the penalty phase of a capital
trial. . . . By another 5-4 vote, a majority of this Court rebuffed an
attack upon this ruling just two Terms ago. . . . Nevertheless, having
expressly invited respondents to renew the attack, today’s majority
overrules [both prior cases] and credits the dissenting views ex-
pressed in those cases.  Neither the law nor the facts supporting
[those cases] underwent any change in the last four years.  Only the
personnel of this Court did. . . .
. . . In dispatching [these two recent cases] to their graves, today’s
majority ominously suggests that an even more extensive upheaval
of this Court’s precedents may be in store. . . .  [T]he majority de-
clares itself free to discard any principle of constitutional liberty
which was recognized or reaffirmed over the dissenting votes of
four Justices and with which five or more Justices now disagree. . . .6
. . . [T]he continued vitality of literally scores of decisions must be
understood to depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the
individuals who now comprise a majority of this Court.7
. . . [T]his impoverished conception of stare decisis cannot possibly
be reconciled with the values that inform the proper judicial func-
tion. . . .  [S]tare decisis is important not merely because individuals
rely on precedent to structure their commercial activity but because
fidelity to precedent is part and parcel of a conception of “the judi-
ciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments. . . .”  [T]he
“strong presumption of validity” to which “recently decided cases”
are entitled “is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that
the law affords the individual. . . . It is the unpopular or beleaguered
individual—not the man in power—who has the greatest stake in
the integrity of the law.”8
. . . [T]he majority’s debilitated conception of stare decisis would
destroy the Court’s very capacity to resolve authoritatively the abid-
ing conflicts between those with power and those without.  If this
Court shows so little respect for its own precedents, it can hardly
6. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844-45 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
7. Id. at 851.
8. Id. at 852-53.
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expect them to be treated more respectfully by the state actors
whom these decisions are supposed to bind.9
Marshall’s words were prophetic.  Since his retirement, the Court
has overturned more than twenty-six cases.  And this number does not
include those cases where the Court, rather than overturning a prece-
dent outright, distinguished it with such unpersuasive rationales that
even those  who agreed with the majority on the results were out-
raged.  In fact, Justice Scalia essentially called Chief Justice Roberts “a
wimp and a hypocrite” for this very reason.10  In Scalia’s words:
[T]he principal opinion’s attempt at distinguishing McConnell [v.
FEC] is unpersuasive enough, the change in the law it works is sub-
stantial enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely di-
vergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at
issue, agree that the opinion effectively overrules McConnell with-
out saying so. . . .  This faux judicial restraint is judicial
obfuscation.11
Scalia added, in a companion case:
Minimalism is an admirable judicial trait, but not when it comes at
the cost of meaningless and disingenuous distinctions that hold sure
promise of engendering further meaningless and disingenuous dis-
tinctions in the future.  The rule of law is ill served by forcing law-
yers and judges to make arguments that deaden the soul of the law
which is logic and reason.12
One area in which the Court has changed direction dramatically
and with which Marshall would be very distressed is the issue of af-
firmative action.  He would be particularly unhappy with the Court’s
movement away from the real world foundations of Brown v. Board
of Education13 and toward an increased reliance on sterile formalisms
so distrusted by Marshall.
The Court first considered an affirmative action case in 1974
when Marco DeFunis, a prospective law student rejected by the Uni-
versity of Washington School of Law, brought suit alleging that less
9. Id. at 853.
10. Linda Greenhouse, Even in Agreement, Scalia Puts Roberts to Lash, N.Y. TIMES, June
28, 2007, at A1 (“It’s not every day that one Supreme Court justice, even one as rhetorically
unrestrained as Justice Antonin Scalia, characterizes another justice, let alone the chief justice of
the United States, as a wimp and a hypocrite.  Yet, Scalia did something very close to that, not
once but twice, in separate opinions on Monday.”).
11. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2684 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
12. Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2582 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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qualified applicants had been admitted as part of an affirmative action
program.14  That affirmative action would be a difficult issue for the
Court became immediately apparent when the majority chose to avoid
the issue.  Five Justices voted to dismiss the case as moot because the
lower court had ordered that plaintiff DeFunis be admitted and by the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, DeFunis was about to grad-
uate.15  This decision to evade the issue triggered an angry dissent by
Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and White, who believed the majority
was simply avoiding a difficult issue that would undoubtedly recur:
[I]n endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court clearly
disserves the public interest.  The constitutional issues which are
avoided today concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and
colleges and universities, as evidenced by the filing of twenty-six
amicus curiae briefs.  Few constitutional questions in recent history
have stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear.  They
must inevitably return to the federal courts and ultimately again to
this Court. . . .  Because avoidance of repetitious litigation serves
the public interest, that inevitability counsels against mootness de-
terminations, as here, not compelled by the record. . . .  Although
the Court should, of course, avoid unnecessary decisions of constitu-
tional questions, we should not transform principles of avoidance of
constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of
difficult cases.16
Not surprisingly, the dissenters were correct.  Only three years
later, in 1977, a virtually identical lawsuit was brought by a prospec-
tive medical student, Allan Bakke, who had been denied admission to
the University of California Medical School at Davis.17  This time, the
Court agreed to hear the case.  In a very complicated decision, five
Justices, including Marshall, held that the University could consider
race in its effort to increase the diversity of the class.18  However, a
14. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 348-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
18. Id.  The Justices disagreed on whether the case should be decided on a constitutional
basis, relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, or on a statutory basis relying on § 601 of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  Four Justices—Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and
Rehnquist—said that Title VI prohibited the affirmative action program at issue, that it was
therefore unnecessary to reach the constitutional issue, and that therefore Bakke should be ad-
mitted. Id. at 408-21.  Four Justices—Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun—found that the
program was permissible under both the statute and the Constitution, and thus, that Bakke was
properly rejected. Id. at 324-79.  Powell provided the critical fifth vote, holding that the Consti-
tution permitted the consideration of race, but that the particular program at issue involved an
unconstitutional quota. Id. at 269-320.
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different group of five Justices, with Justice Powell again the key fifth
vote, held that the particular program of the University of California
was unlawful because it included a quota.  Thus, there were five votes
in favor of Bakke’s admission.  But, more importantly, there were five
votes supporting the concept of affirmative action.  Marshall was
pleased with that aspect of the opinion, as he indicated in a separate
opinion:
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must
permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in
making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, af-
fluence, and prestige in America.  For far too long, the doors to
those positions have been shut to Negroes.  If we are ever to be-
come a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a person’s
skin will not determine the opportunities available to him or her, we
must be willing to take steps to open those doors.19
Justice Harry Blackmun also supported the Court’s approval of
the concept of affirmative action, observing succinctly: “In order to
get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.  There is no
other way.”20  The Court’s very fractured line-up in Bakke confirmed
that this issue was very controversial and not likely to go away any-
time soon.
After Bakke, additional affirmative action cases came to the
Court—some in the educational domain, others in business settings.
The biggest source of contention among the Justices was deciding the
appropriate standard of review for these cases.  Should the standard
be strict scrutiny because the government was using race-based classi-
fications?  Or, should it be intermediate scrutiny because the intent
behind the programs was benign, not malevolent?  No standard could
garner five votes so each Justice applied his or her own standard.  The
result was a jurisdictional mess.
Justices Marshall and Brennan argued passionately for intermedi-
ate scrutiny.  In their view, there was a marked difference between
programs that hurt minorities and those that were adopted to amelio-
rate the effects of past discrimination.21  Thus, in City of Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co.,22 when the majority of the Court appeared to adopt
a strict scrutiny standard, at least for affirmative action plans adopted
19. Id. at 401-02 (Marshall, J., writing separately).
20. Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., writing separately).
21. Id. at 401 (Marshall, J., writing separately).
22. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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by states and municipalities,23 Marshall dissented.  Criticizing those
who were advocating strict scrutiny, Marshall said:
A profound difference separates governmental actions that them-
selves are racist, and governmental actions that seek to remedy the
effects of prior racism. . . .  Racial classifications “drawn on the pre-
sumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the
weight of government behind racial hatred and separatism” warrant
the strictest judicial scrutiny because of the very irrelevance of these
rationales.  By contrast, racial classifications drawn for the purpose
of remedying the effects of discrimination that itself was race based
have a highly pertinent basis: the tragic and indelible fact that dis-
crimination against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation
has pervaded our Nation’s history and continues to scar our society.
As I stated in Fullilove: “Because the consideration of race is rele-
vant to remedying the continuing effects of past racial discrimina-
tion, and because governmental programs employing racial
classifications for remedial purposes can be crafted to avoid stigma-
tization . . . such programs should not be subjected to conventional
‘strict scrutiny’—scrutiny that is strict in theroy, but fatal in fact.”24
Then, in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,25 one of Justice Brennan’s
last opinions for the Court, it looked as if the Court finally had five
votes to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard, at least for federal
programs.26  In an opinion written by Justice Brennan, and joined by
Justices Marshall, White, Blackmun, and Stevens, the Court upheld a
federal regulation designed to enhance minority participation in radio
and television ownership.27  The Court distinguished Croson on the
basis that the constitutional limitation on city and state use of race as a
distinguishing factor among businesses comes from the Fourteenth
Amendment, while the Fifth Amendment governs federal programs.28
But Metro Broadcasting turned out to be a fleeting victory for
Marshall and Brennan’s intermediate scrutiny standard.  In 1995, a
few years after both had retired, the new Court, with Clarence
Thomas taking Marshall’s seat and David Souter replacing Brennan,
voted 5-4 to reject the intermediate scrutiny standard for all govern-
23. Id. at 508 (holding that the plan was not narrowly tailored enough to be constitutional).
24. Id. at 551-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
25. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
26. See id. at 566.  As noted above, one year before Metro Broadcasting, the Court used
strict scrutiny to find unconstitutional a plan by the city of Richmond to increase the participa-
tion of minority subcontractors in city contracts.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 605-06.
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ment programs.29  In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,30 the Court
announced, “any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand
that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any
racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under
the strictest judicial scrutiny.”31  Henceforth, the standard of review
for all affirmative action programs—federal, state, and local—would
be strict scrutiny.  Thus, to pass constitutional muster, affirmative ac-
tion programs must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling govern-
mental interest.32
How have affirmative action programs fared under strict scru-
tiny?  In a word: Badly.  Once again, Marshall had been prophetic.  As
he suggested in his dissenting opinion in Croson, strict scrutiny has
turned out to be strict in theory, but virtually fatal in fact.33  Marshall
predicted the Court would strike down more affirmative action pro-
grams,34 and he was correct: it has.  In 2005, in one of Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor’s last significant decisions before her retirement, she
provided the crucial fifth vote to decide the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan’s affirmative action admission programs.  The
Court decided, 5-4, to strike down the undergraduate school’s pro-
gram;35 it was not narrowly tailored enough.36  In the companion law
school case, O’Connor provided the crucial fifth vote to uphold that
program, because, in her view, the law program utilized sufficiently
individualized consideration.37  Unfortunately for the supporters of af-
firmative action, the undergraduate case has proven to be the more
29. Since Thomas voted differently from Marshall and Souter voted the same way that
Brennan had in these cases, the outcome changed.  It was still 5-4, but in the opposite direction.
30. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
31. Id. at 224.
32. Id. at 227.
33. 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
518-19 (1980)).
34. Id. at 561 (“The new and restrictive tests [the Court] applies scuttle one city’s effort to
surmount its discriminatory past, and imperil those of dozens more localities.”).
35. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
36. Id. at 276-77 (“Unlike the law school admissions policy . . . , the procedures employed
by the . . . Office of Undergraduate Admissions do not provide for a meaningful individualized
review of applicants. . . . The law school considers the various diversity qualifications of each
applicant, including race, on a case-by-case basis. . . . By contrast, the Office of Undergraduate
Admissions relies on the selection index to assign every underrepresented minority applicant the
same, automatic 20-point bonus without consideration of the particular background, experiences,
or qualities of each individual applicant. . . . The selection index thus precludes . . . the type of
individualized consideration the Court’s opinion in Grutter . . . requires”) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (citations omitted).
37. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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durable precedent.  The law school’s victory for affirmative action was
short-lived.
Just two years after the Michigan cases, in the spring of 2007, the
Court considered the constitutionality of two race conscious programs
designed by local school boards in Seattle and Louisville to keep the
local schools from becoming more segregated.38  By this time, Justice
O’Connor had been replaced by Justice Samuel Alito, who joined
those Justices opposed to race-based programs.  Writing for a plurality
including Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts applied
strict scrutiny and said, “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”39  Justice Kennedy
provided the fifth vote to strike these programs down, but was careful
not to rule out the possibility that some “race conscious programs”
might still be constitutional.  According to Kennedy:
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of
diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including stra-
tegic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with
general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocat-
ing resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in
a targeted fashion; tracking enrollments, performance, and other
statistics by race.  These mechanisms are race conscious but do not
lead to a different treatment based on a classification that tells each
student he or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any of
them would demand strict scrutiny to be found permissible.40
But because the programs at issue in the Seattle and Louisville
cases classified students on the basis of race, they required strict scru-
tiny.  And under such scrutiny, they were unconstitutional because, in
Kennedy’s view, they were not narrowly tailored enough.41
38. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v.  Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007);
Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
39. 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
40. Id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 2791-92.  In Kennedy’s view:
This Nation has a moral and ethnical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to
creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all its children.  A
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district,
in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue.  Likewise, a district may consider
it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population.  Race may be one com-
ponent of that diversity, but other demographic factors, plus special talents and needs,
should also be considered.  What the government is not permitted to do, absent a show-
ing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to
assign each of them to schools based on that classification.  Crude measures of this sort
threaten to reduce children to racial chits valued and traded according to one school’s
supply and another’s demand.
Id. at 2797.
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The dissenters—Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter—agreed
with Kennedy that strict scrutiny need not be applied to all race con-
scious programs.  But they assumed that Adarand and Grutter re-
quired that strict scrutiny be applied in these cases; nonetheless, even
under that strict standard, the dissent found these programs constitu-
tional.  Given the programs’ purpose—to encourage integration and
decrease segregation—the scrutiny, while “strict,” should not be “fatal
in fact.”42  As Justice Breyer noted for the dissenters:
[These programs do not use race] to decide who will receive goods
or services that are normally distributed on the basis of merit and
which are in short supply.  [They do not] stigmatize or exclude; the
limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise
significantly exacerbate racial tensions.  They do not impose bur-
dens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek ben-
efits for members of all races alike.  The context here is one of racial
limits that seek, not to keep the races apart, but to bring them
together.43
That is where the law stands today.  Race-conscious methods de-
signed to fight segregation and increase integration are not per se un-
constitutional.  However, they are on thin-ice.  In order to survive
judicial scrutiny today, schools desiring to avoid becoming more ra-
cially segregated must design programs that accommodate Justice
Kennedy’s idiosyncratic view.
Looking more philosophically at the arguments for and against
affirmative action, it is clear that both sides agree on the ultimate goal.
Ideally, all people should be treated the same, regardless of race; ra-
cial distinctions should generally be irrelevant.  The disagreement is
whether we have reached the point when, given our history and the
effects of past discrimination, we can, should, and must abandon all
such distinctions.  Justice Marshall described the dispute well in his
address to the Second Circuit Judicial Conference in September 1986:
I believe all of the participants in the current debate about affirma-
tive action agree that the ultimate goal is the creation of a color-
blind society.  From this common premise, however, two very
different conclusions have apparently been drawn: The first is that
race-conscious remedies may not be used to eliminate the effects of
past discrimination in American society.  This conclusion has been
expanded into the proposition that courts and parties entering into
42. Id. at 2817-18 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 2818.
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consent decrees are limited to remedies which provide relief to
identified individual victims of discrimination only.  But the second
conclusion which may be drawn from our common preference for a
color blind society is that the vestiges of racial bias in America are
so pernicious, and so difficult to remove, that we must take advan-
tage of all the remedial measures at our disposal.  The difference
between these views may be accounted for, at least in part, by dif-
ference of opinion as to how close we presently are to the ‘color-
blind society’ about which everybody talks.44
As Justice Marshall said, all agree the ultimate ideal goal is a col-
orblind society, but they differ on what path to take to get there.  Jus-
tice Marshall clearly believed in what he called “the second
conclusion.”  As he said in his Second Circuit address:
Justice Harlan, . . . dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, gave the first
expression to the judicial principle that ‘our constitution is color-
blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’  If
Justice Harlan’s views had prevailed, and Plessy been decided upon
the principle of race neutrality, our situation now, 90 years later,
would be far different than it is.  Affirmative action is an issue today
precisely needed because our constitution was not color-blind in the
60 years which intervened between Plessy and Brown.
Obviously, I too believe in a colorblind society; but it has been
and remains an aspiration.  It is a goal toward which our society has
progressed uncertainly, bearing as it does the enormous burden of
incalculable injuries inflicted by race prejudice and other bigotries
which the law once sanctioned, and even encouraged.  Not having
attained our goal, we must face the simple fact that there are groups
in every community which are daily paying the cost of the history of
American injustice.  The argument against affirmative action is but
an argument in favor of leaving that cost to lie where it falls.  Our
fundamental sense of fairness, particularly as it is embodied in the
guarantee of equal protection under the law, requires us to make an
effort to see that those costs are shared equitably while we continue
to work for the eradication of the consequnces of discrimination.
Otherwise, we must admit to ourselves that so long as the lingering
effects of inequality are with us, the burden will be borne by those
who are least able to pay.45
44. Thurgood Marshall, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit
Justice for the Second Circuit, Address at the Annual Judicial Conference, Second Judicial Cir-
cuit of the United States (Sept. 5, 1986), in 115 F.R.D. 349, 351-52 (1987).
45. Id. at 352-53.
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Yet Marshall did not blindly approve all affirmative action pro-
grams.  He understood the downside of using racial differences and
believed there should be some judicial scrutiny of such programs.  In
Marshall’s words:
This is not to say, of course, that affirmative remedies such as the
establishment of goals, time tables, and all of that, in hiring, in pro-
motion, or for protection of recently hired minority workers from
the disproportionate effects of layoffs, are always necessary or ap-
propriate.  Where there is no admission or proof of past discrimina-
tory conduct, or where those individuals whose existing interests
may be adversely affected by the remedy have not had an opportu-
nity to participate, serious questions arise which must be carefully
scrutinized.46
Thus, Marshall advocated careful, or intermediate, scrutiny.47
Strict scrutiny was too demanding and rational review was too lenient.
Intermediate—careful—scrutiny was just right.  Under this standard
of review, affirmative action programs are constitutional if the govern-
ment proves the classification “serve[s] important governmental
objectives and is substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.”48
Justice Thomas has spoken for those who disagree with Marshall.
In Adarand, Thomas wrote:
[T]here is a “moral [and] constitutional equivalence” . . . between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits
on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equal-
ity.  Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, re-
spect, and protect us as equal before the law.
That these programs may have been motivated . . . by good
intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our
Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the ba-
sis of race.  As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant
whether a government’s racial classifications are drawn by those
who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to
help those thought to be disadvantaged.
46. Id. at 353.
47. Id.
48. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (announcing the standard of intermediate scru-
tiny and applying it to assess the constitutionality of  gender-based classifications).
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. . .  [T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unin-
tended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicous as any
other form of discrimination.49
Over time, many of the Justices who believed in what Marshall
called the “second conclusion”—that is, those believing that affirma-
tive action was still necessary—began to retire from the Court.  At the
same time, those who believed in the “first conclusion”—those gener-
ally opposed to governmental use of racial classifications—gained as-
cendancy.  That is the best explanation for the results in the recent
Seattle and Louisville school cases.  As Justice Stevens noted in his
dissent in the Seattle case: “It is my firm conviction that no Member
of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s
decision.”50
An essential difference between those like Marshall, who gener-
ally favor affirmative action, and those like Thomas, who oppose it,51
is a fundamental disagreement over Brown v. Board of Education52
and its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement
for “equal protection of the laws.”53
For Thomas, Brown means the law should be colorblind.  As he
wrote in the Seattle case:
What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today.  Whatever else the
Court’s rejection of the segregationists’ arguments in Brown might
have established, it certainly made clear that state and local govern-
ments cannot take from the Constitution a right to make decisions
on the basis of race by adverse possession.  The fact that state and
local governments had been discriminating on the basis of race for a
long time was irrelevant to the Brown Court.  The fact that racial
discrimination was preferable to the relevant communities was irrel-
evant to the Brown Court.  And the fact that the state and local
governments had relied on statements in this Court’s opinions was
irrelevant to the Brown Court.  The same principles guide today’s
decision.  None of the considerations trumpeted by the dissent is
relevant to the constitutionality of the school boards’ race-based
49. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
50. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Included among those Justices who favor affirmative action are Marshall, Brennan,
Blackmun, Ginsburg, Breyer, Souter, Stevens, and White.  Included among those opposed are
Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, Roberts, Alito, Burger, and Stewart.  As noted, Powell, O’Connor
and Kennedy held somewhat intermediate views.
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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plans because no contextual detail . . . can “provide refuge from the
principle that under our Constitution, the government may not
make distinctions on the basis of race.”54
For Marshall (who had successfully argued for the plaintiffs in
Brown) and his supporters, Brown means there should be no more
discrimination and no more segregation; remedies should be aimed at
integration.  It does not mean there can be no race conscious efforts to
promote integration.  As Stevens said in his dissent in Seattle:
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice’s reliance on our decision
in Brown v. Board of Education . . .  The first sentence in the con-
cluding paragraph of [Robert’s] opinion states: “Before Brown,
schoolchildren were told where they could and could not go to
school based on the color of their skin.”  This sentence reminds me
of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he majestic equality of the
la[w] forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal their bread.”  The Chief Justice fails to note
that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed,
the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to
attend black schools.  In this and other ways, the Chief Justice re-
writes the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.55
Justice Breyer, in his Seattle dissent, asked:
What of the hope and promise of Brown?  For much of this Nation’s
history, the races remained divided.  It was not long ago that people
of different races drank from separate fountains, rode on separate
buses, and studied in separate schools.  In this Court’s finest hour,
Brown v. Board of Education challenged this history and helped to
change it.  For Brown held out a promise.  It was a promise embod-
ied in three Amendments designed to make citizens of slaves.  It
was the promise of a true racial equality—not as a matter of fine
words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s
cities and schools.  It was about the nature of a democracy that must
work for all Americans.  It sought one law, one Nation, one people,
not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we
actually live.
. . . Today, almost 50 years later, attitudes toward race in this Nation
have changed dramatically.  Many parents, white and black alike,
want their children to attend schools with children of different
races.  Indeed, the very school districts that once spurned integra-
tion now strive for it.  The long history of their efforts reveals the
54. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2786 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995)).
55. Id. at 2797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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complexities and difficulties they have faced.  And in light of those
challenges, they have asked us not to take from their hands the in-
struments they have used to rid their schools of racial segregation,
instruments that they believe are needed to overcome the problems
of cities divided by race and poverty.  The plurality would decline
their modest request.
The plurality is wrong to do so.  The last half-century has wit-
nessed great strides toward racial equality, but we have not yet real-
ized the promise of Brown.  To invalidate the plans under review is
to threaten the promise of Brown.  The plurality’s position, I fear,
would break that promise.  This is a decision that the Court and the
Nation will come to regret.56
As noted earlier, all agree that, ideally, a colorblind society is the
ultimate goal.  The disagreement concerns what we can, and should,
do now.  Marshall and those voting like him assert we are not there
yet and, accordingly, we may use race conscious methods, if necessary.
Thomas and those voting with him assert that, whether or not we are
there, the use of discrimination to get to a colorblind state is funda-
mentally wrong and unconstitutional.57
What accounts for the two different views articulated by Marshall
and Thomas?  Without attempting to be a psychoanalyst, I would sug-
gest that different life experiences are highly relevant.  Both Marshall
and Thomas had confronted racial discrimination and both hated
56. Id. at 2836-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. Justice O’Connor characteristically took a somewhat modified position in these affirma-
tive action cases, one closer to Marshall’s than to Thomas’s.  In the University of Michigan Law
School case, writing for the majority, O’Connor expressed the hope that in 25 years, such pro-
grams would no longer be necessary.  As she said:
We take the Law School at its word that it would “like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula” and will terminate its race-conscious admissions pro-
gram as soon as practicable. . . .  It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved
the use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education.  Since that time, the number of minority applicants with high grades
and test scores has indeed increased. . . .  We expect that 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (citations omitted).
Thomas tried to make this reference to 25 years a deadline, saying: “It is difficult to assess the
Court’s pronouncement that race-conscious admissions programs will be unnecessary 25 years
from now.” Id. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  But Justice Ginsburg made it clear that the
majority had simply expressed a hope, not a deadline: “As lower school education in minority
communities improves, an increase in the number of . . . students [who can meet admission
standards without the need for affirmative action] may be anticipated.  From today’s vantage
point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, progress
toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirma-
tive action.” Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See CARL COHEN & JAMES P. STERBA, AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCE: A DEBATE (2003) (discussing the pros and cons
of affirmative action).
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those encounters.  Marshall knew firsthand the experience of not be-
ing able to find a men’s restroom in downtown Baltimore or a hotel in
most of the South.58  He was barred from the University of Maryland
Law School because he was black.59  As he traveled the country liti-
gating against “separate but equal,” he had trouble finding places to
stay and to eat.60  Thomas, too, had experienced the pain of discrimi-
nation.  Growing up in the heavily segregated deep-South of the 1940s
and 50s, the “second class status [of blacks] was so firmly accepted,”
Thomas said, “that no unpleasantness was needed to enforce it.”61
Like Marshall, he had experienced separate water fountains and ex-
clusions from whites-only “parks, schools, restaurants, movie theaters,
and libraries.”62
But, because Clarence Thomas was born 40 years after Marshall,
his life experiences were different.  Both had experienced racial dis-
crimination, but Thomas, unlike Marshall, had personally experienced
the downsides of affirmative action in his education, including its
costs.63  As he said in his autobiography, Thomas believed that affirm-
ative action devalued his law degree from Yale University.64  Describ-
ing his search for a job, Thomas explained:
58. See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 60 (describing a trip Marshall and Charles Hamilton
Houston took to the south to investigate school facilities during which they stayed in private
residences); see also id. at 106 (explaining how hotels would not accept black travelers on Mar-
shall’s trips to the South on behalf of the NAACP).
59. It is fitting to note that Howard University School of Law was the beneficiary of that
decision by Maryland.  Instead of Maryland, Marshall enrolled at Howard and graduated in
1933, first in his class.  Fittingly, one of Marshall’s first legal actions after graduation was to sue
the University of Maryland, challenging its discriminatory policies.  And he won. See Pearson v.
Murray, 169 Md. 478 (1936).  Years later, when the University of Maryland dedicated its law
library in Marshall’s honor and invited him to attend the opening, Marshall refused to attend.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 371-73 (“[Justice Marshall] told [the dean of the law school] that
since there had been no place for the young Thurgood Marshall at the school, he would not have
anything to do with it now.”).  When the dean invited other members of Court to the ceremony,
Marshall wrote to his colleagues: “I will not go there.  I am very certain that Maryland is trying
to salve its conscience for excluding the Negroes from the University of Maryland for such a long
period of time.”  Juan Williams, Poetic Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2004, at A4.
60. One of my favorite Marshall stories is his account of a southern trip in which he had
stopped off at a small Mississippi town and was contemplating an overnight stay: “I was out
there on the train platform, trying to look small, when this cold-eyed man with a gun on his hip
comes up.  ‘Nigguh,’ he said, ‘I thought you oughta know the sun ain’t nevah set on a live nigguh
in this town.’  So I wrapped my constitutional rights in cellophane, tucked ’em in my hip pocket
. . . and caught the next train out of there.” RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 224 (1976).
61. CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHERS SON: A MEMOIR 31-35 (2007); see also KEVIN
MERIDA AND MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF CLAR-
ENCE THOMAS 61 (2007).
62. THOMAS, supra note 61, at 32.
63. Id. at 86-87.
64. Id.
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One high-priced lawyer after another treated me dismissively, mak-
ing it clear that they had no interest in me despite my Ivy League
pedigree.  Many asked pointed questions unsubtly suggesting that
they doubted I was as smart as my grades indicated.  A firm in At-
lanta briefly seemed interested in me, then started to blow hot and
cold, stringing me along with expressions of interest but refusing to
make a commitment. . . .  By late December I had yet to receive a
single job offer.  Now I knew what a law degree from Yale was
worth when it bore the taint of racial preference.  I was humili-
ated—and desperate.65
Thomas concluded: “Those blacks who benefited from [affirma-
tive action] were being judged by a double standard. . . .  But it was
futile for me to suppose that I could escape the stigmatizing effects of
racial preference, and I began to fear that it would be used forever
after to discount my achievements.”66
Those experiences clearly influenced Justice Thomas’s views of
affirmative action throughout his years on the bench.  In the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law case, he wrote:
It is uncontested that each year, the Law School admits a handful of
blacks who would be admitted in the absence of racial discrimina-
tion. . . .  Who can differentiate between those who belong and
those who do not?  The majority of blacks are admitted to the Law
School because of discrimination, and because of this policy all are
tarred as undeserving.  This problem of stigma does not depend on
determinacy as to whether those stigmatized are actually the “bene-
ficiaries” of racial discrimination.  When blacks take positions in the
highest places of government, industry, or academia, it is an open
question today whether their skin color played a part in their ad-
vancement.  The question itself is the stigma—because either racial
discrimination did play a role, in which case the person may be
deemed “otherwise unqualified,” or it did not, in which case asking
the question itself unfairly marks those blacks who would succeed
without discrimination.67
Speaking more generally about affirmative action, Thomas
opined in his separate opinion in Adarand:
These programs not only raise grave constitutional questions, they
also undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle.
Purchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal
65. Id.
66. Id. at 74-75.
67. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such
classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual
and our society.  Unquestionably, “invidious [racial] discrimination
is an engine of oppression,” . . .  It is also true that “[r]emedial”
racial preferences may reflect “a desire to foster equality in soci-
ety.”  But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unin-
tended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicous as any
other form of discrimination.  So-called “benign” discrmination
teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable
handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without patroniz-
ing indulgence.  Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of su-
periority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who
believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of
race.  These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority
and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an atti-
tude that they are “entitled” to preferences.68
What can we learn from these observations?  If nothing else, it
seems clear that the life experiences of a judge affect his or her judi-
cial views.  In particular, experiencing discrimination and affirmative
action seems to influence one’s opinions.69  Thus, diversity on the
Court, especially diverse life experiences, is extremely important.
And of course, the ability to share those experiences is vital.  Justice
O’Connor explicitly applauded and appreciated Marshall’s stories
about his experiences.  In Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Rac-
onteur,70 Justice O’Connor noted:
Although all of us come to the court with our own personal histories
and experiences, Justice Marshall brought a special perspective.  His
was the eye of a lawyer who saw the deepest wounds in the social
fabric and used law to help heal them.  His was the ear of a coun-
selor who understood the vulnerabilities of the accused and estab-
68. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
69. That seems clear, looking not only at the views of Marshall and Thomas, but also at
those of Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg, especially in the areas of discrimination, affirmative
action, and abortion. See Craig Joyce, Afterword: Lazy B and the Nation’s Court: Pragmatism in
Service of Principle, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1257, 1267 (2006) (“Her common sense approach to
issues, while perhaps first formed in ranch days, had been honed . . . by her experience as a
legislator and state court judge.”); see also Brenda Kruse, Women of the Highest Court: Does
Gender Bias or Personal Life Experiences Influence Their Opinions, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 995,
1003 (2005) (“Although life experiences may not be overwhelmingly influential in Justice
O’Connor’s and Justice Ginsburg’s opinions, the fact that both women were victims of sex dis-
crimination may be the reason why the Justices frequently agree on Title VII cases.”).  But ex-
ploring the views of Justices O’Connor and Ginsburg must be left to another paper.
70. Sandra D. O’Connor, Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1217 (1992).
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lished safeguards for their protection.  His was the mouth of a man
who knew the anguish of the silenced and gave them voice.71
Justice O’Connor illustrated her point with a typical Thurgood Mar-
shall story:
I was particularly moved by a story Justice Marshall told during the
time the Court was considering a case in which an African Ameri-
can defendant challenged his death sentence as racially biased.
Something in the conversation caused his eyebrows to raise charac-
teristically, and with a pregnant pause, to say: “That reminds me of
a story.”  And so it began, this depiction of justice in operation.72
In conclusion, as we celebrate Thurgood Marshall’s 100th birth-
day, it is important to appreciate and applaud his uniquely valuable
contributions to the Court.  As one of the only members of the Court
who had personally experienced race discrimination, who had de-
fended real people on death row, who had seen innocent people con-
victed and poor people starve, Marshall was able to remind his
brethren of the real world and its complexities.73  Sterile formulas de-
71. Id. at 1217.
72. Id. at 1218.  According to O’Connor, Marshall then told of a client who was accused of
raping a white woman.  The government offered a life sentence in prison, instead of the death
penalty, if the defendant agreed to plead guilty.  Marshall recounted that the client adamantly
refused to plead guilty.  “Raping that woman?  You gotta be kidding.  I won’t [plead].”  Accord-
ing to Marshall, that is when he knew his client was an innocent man.  Nonetheless, the man was
convicted.  “But,” said Marshall, “he never raped that woman . . . . .  Oh well,” Marshall added,
“he was just a Negro.” Id.  That story helps to explain Marshall’s abhorrence of the death pen-
alty.  As he stated in Furman v. Georgia:
Just as Americans know little about who is executed and why, they are unaware of the
potential dangers of executing an innocent man.  Our ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ bur-
den of proof in criminal cases is intended to protect the innocent, but we know it is not
foolproof.  Various studies have shown that people whose innocence is later convinc-
ingly established are convicted and sentenced to death. . . . We have no way of judging
how many innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain that there were
some.  Whether there were many is an open question made difficult by the loss of those
who were most knowledgeable about the crime for which they were convicted.  Surely
there will be more as long as capital punishment remains part of our penal law.
408 U.S. 238, 366-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).  Marshall believed that the death penalty
was inherently cruel and unusual and thus a violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Ultimately,
Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens agreed. See Linda Greenhouse, Death Penalty Is Renounced
By Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1994, at A1 (“‘From this day forward, I no longer shall
tinker with the machinery of death,’ Justice Blackmun, the Court’s 85-year-old senior member,
wrote in an emotional, highly personal and solitary dissent from the Court’s refusal to hear the
appeal of a Texas inmate. . . . Justice Blackmun’s tone was urgent, as if in the twilight of his
career he wanted to reopen a dialogue on the death penalty that had all but disappeared from
the Court with the retirements of Justices William J. Brennan Jr. and Thurgood Marshall, who
both believed that the death penalty was inherently unconstitutional.”); see also Linda Green-
house, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2008, at A22.
73. When the Court upheld the imposition of a fifty dollar filing fee for a bankruptcy peti-
tion by minimizing the magnitude of the fee, Marshall dissented angrily.  Noting that the “des-
perately poor almost never go to see a movie,” while the majority assume it to be “an almost
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tached from reality were, in his view, inadequate for the difficult is-
sues that come before the Court. As Justice Byron White noted:
Thurgood brought to the conference table years of experience in an
area that was of vital importance to our work, experience that none
of us could claim to match.  Thurgood could tell us the way it was,
and he did so convincingly, often embellishing with humorous,
sometimes hair-raising, stories straight from his own past.  He char-
acteristically would tell us things that we know but would rather
forget; and he told us much that we did not know due to the limita-
tion of our own experience.74
Marshall, said Justice Kennedy, reminded his brethren of their
“moral obligation as a people to confront those tragedies of the
human condition which continue to haunt even the richest and freest
of countries.”75  Marshall’s best friend, Justice Brennan, summed it up
best:
Justice Marshall’s persuasive voice made all of us more sensitive to
the legacy of discrimination.  As President Johnson predicted at the
time of his nomination, placing Thurgood Marshall on the Court
was “the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man and
the right place.”  This was true not only in the desegregation era,
but also in later years, when questions such as affirmative action
reached the Court.76
Let us hope that our future Presidents choose their appointees as
wisely, nominating individuals with the breadth of knowledge, experi-
ence, and wisdom that Thurgood Marshall brought to the Court.  Such
appointments will be the ones that pay true homage to the legacy of
Thurgood Marshall.
weekly activity.” Marshall complained: “It is perfectly proper for judges to disagree about what
the Constitution requires, but it is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be
premised upon unfounded assumptions about how people live . . . No one who has had close
contact with poor people can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of
them are.” See Susan Low Bloch, Foreword: Do What You Can, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994)
(citing United States v. Kras, 409, 434, 460 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); Susan Low Bloch,
Foreword: Thurgood Marshall: Courageous Advocate, Compassionate Judge, 80 GEO. L.J. 2003,
2004-05 (1992).
74. Byron White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216
(1992); see also O’Connor, supra note 70, at 1217 (“At oral arguments and conference meetings,
in opinions and dissents, Justice Marshall imparted not only his legal acumen but also his life
experiences, constantly pushing and prodding us to respond not only to the persuasiveness of
legal argument but also to the power of moral truth.”).
75. Anthony Kennedy, The Voice of Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1221, 1221
(1992).
76. Id.
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